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Crafting a new interpretation about the recent protests in Hong Kong entails a number of 
decisions about content, focus and analysis. The anti-extradition law collective action is the 
most significant and highly documented protest in Hong Kong history, with multiple 
monographs already published and scholarly archives in development. It has built on the 
history of Hong Kong activism for universal suffrage. The issues at stake implicate 
fundamental differences in worldviews and unprecedented commitments to support them. 
 
This discussion identifies the salient political events and takes the view from the street 
through the DIY poster culture of public documentation and its representations of police 
activity. It pivots to contextualize the global city by comparison to the territorial status of 
Hong Kong in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in which Hong Kong is a special 
administrative region (SAR) subject to the potential of calculated institutional change. 
 
The 2019–20 anti-extradition collective action marks a plateau in the Hong Kong movement 
for universal suffrage. The 2019 local District Council elections demonstrated its significance 
and success. On 24 November 2019, Hong Kong citizens voted in unprecedented numbers for 
pro-democracy candidates. In the four years from 2015, with the exception of one outlying 
district, the districts flipped from ‘Pro-Beijing’ control to ‘Pro-democracy’ control. Figures 1 
& 2. Although the Islands District, the blue area in Figure 2, also elected a majority of 









The election landslide was not anticipated by the state. The Hong Kong government and the 
PRC central government regrouped in anticipation of the more significant September 2020 
Legislative Council election. Before it could take place, the central government promulgated 
a state security law that is rendered in English as the National Security Law. Subsequent to its 
implementation, on 30 June 2020, the Hong Kong government disqualified several pro-
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democracy candidates, banned the annual July 1st citizens’ march for universal suffrage, and 
postponed the Legislative Council election. 
 
The state security law seeks an expansive mandate. It would make criminal, anywhere, the 
representation of language that places ‘Hong Kong’ in relation to words alone that suggest its 
separation from the PRC. Its meta-philosophy is party-state integrity or the authority of the 
Chinese Communist Party and sovereign power over state territory and its representations. 
Hong Kong citizens apprehended such claims. In early July 2020 people gathered in small 
numbers, on the street and in shopping malls, and held up plain white sheets of A4 paper. 
Even the display of blank A4, witty if cynical, resulted in arrests. Reaching to describe the 
situation, the author and journalist Louisa Lim adopts the Kafkaesque and Pythonesque. The 
police detained one citizen for shouting ‘long live Liverpool’ after the team won its first 
Premier League title in thirty years. 
 
The September 2019 District Council elections followed months of organized action against 
the Hong Kong government-proposed extradition bill, formally the Fugitive Offenders and 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill. The amendment 
would allow the extradition of Hong Kong citizens to mainland China for alleged criminal 
offences, i.e. from a jurisdiction based on an executive-led legislature with a relatively 
independent judicial system, to the legal regime of the Leninist state that returns guilty 
verdicts in criminal cases at rates greater than ninety-nine percent. Beginning in March 2019 
the Civil Human Rights Front organized marches to protest the bill.  
 	
Hong Kong has a significant history of organized, largely peaceful social movement activity. 
In June 2019 clashes between the police and protesters changed the tenor of events. Outside 
the Legislative Council building, on 12 June, police confronted a protest group seeking to 
prevent the second reading of the bill. Based on footage of the scene, Amnesty International 
concludes police unlawfully used batons and rubber bullets in violation of international 
human rights law. Police authorities subsequently called the protest a ‘riot’, which invokes a 
colonial era tactic, and is a criminal offense punishable by a ten-year prison sentence. On 15 
June the Hong Kong government announced the bill would be suspended, but not withdrawn. 
An estimated two million people, a new high for Hong Kong civic action, marched the 
following day. In response, the Hong Kong Chief Executive performed an apology to the 
people but did not withdraw the bill. 
 
People’s concerns commensurably expanded and coalesced in the position statement ‘Five 
Demands, Not One Less’: full withdrawal of the bill, an official inquiry into police brutality, 
amnesty for arrested protesters, retraction of the ‘riot’ classification, and universal suffrage 
for the Legislative Council and Chief Executive. Figures 3 & 4. The poster in Figure 4 
updates the aesthetic of local neon signage and combines the five demands statement with a 






             
 
Figure 3. ‘Five Demands, Not One Less’.            Figure 4. ‘Five Demands, Not One Less’ 
University of Hong Kong poster wall,                Mong Kok public passageway, Hong Kong, October, 2019.  




Where the authoritarian state surveils its representations, symbolic politics are never far from 
the surface. At the end of the route of the July 21st march some participants continued west 
across Hong Kong island to Sai Ying Pun, location of the Liaison Office of the Central 
People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The national symbol 
of the PRC on the façade of the Liaison Office became a target, reportedly, for ink balloons. 
That night a group of ‘thugs-for-hire’ attacked people in the Yuen Long MTR station, some 
ostensibly returning from protests ‘because they were wearing black’. Filmed and posted to 
social media, evidence of the attack ricocheted worldwide and electrified the indignation of 
already outraged publics. In subsequent weeks and months documentation of the 7.21 
Incident appeared widely around town. Figures 5 & 6. Meanwhile the Liaison Office erected 
a plexiglass barrier over the symbol of the state. As a discerning local headline captured it, 








Figure 5. ‘7.21 Yuen Long Attack’. Yau Tsim Mong District Council Community Notice Board,  






Figure 6. ‘7.21 Yuen Long Attack’. Infographic.  
University of Hong Kong poster wall, January 2020.  






Policing diversified in forms and practices and expanded across the second half of 2019. New 
ordnance on display became a subject of rational documentation as if in the public interest. 
The police rolled out armored-vehicle-mounted long-range sonic devices and water cannons 
firing blue-dyed water to mark people for potential arrest. They fired tear gas inside shopping 
malls. The materialization of intensified policing became the execrable talk of the town. It is 
also becoming a subject of analysis in united front-work. Victoria Tin-bor Hui characterizes 
the escalation of policing in Hong Kong in 2019 as Beijing’s development of struggle and 
violence in order to govern it. 
 
The international mediatization of social movement activity has magnified the episodic street 
protest. It contributed to naming the Umbrella Movement in 2014, which followed the pro-
democracy campaign Occupy Central with Peace and Love, 2013–14. The umbrella had 
become a piece of street gear, a practical shield. (The 2011–12 Occupy Central protest allied 
with the global movement against socioeconomic inequality.) In 2019 the confrontations 
between umbrella-shielded, gas-masked protesters and police tactical units, facing off in 
gleaming high-rise canyons of the global financial district, marked by gleaming towers, 
yielded cinematic footage for local and global audiences. Protesters’ practices and tactics 
‘like water’, Telegram-based, and color-coded, gained regard for innovative collective action. 
Figures 7 & 8. Color codes for the consumer landscape, for instance, communicate about 
shops and restaurants in relation to what political commitments their profits accumulate. The 
community notice board in Figure 9, like the one in Figure 5, is in Mong Kok, the established 




        
Figure 7. ‘Pantone: Tear gas grey’   Figure 8. ‘Pantone: Filter pink’ 
University of Hong Kong poster wall, January 2020. University of Hong Kong poster wall, January 2020. 









Figure 9. ‘Mong Kok “stop purchasing” map’. Yau Tsim Mong District Council Community Notice Board, 




Notice boards in the districts serve as sites of information in the public interest on matters of 
prevailing concern. The 8.31 Incident at Prince Edward MTR station also dominated the DIY 
poster culture in Mong Kok. On Saturday night, 31 August 2019, according to the 
government-affiliated English-language newspaper of record, police tactical units ‘in pursuit 
of anti-government protesters enter[ed] train carriages and beat people with batons and 
pepper spray’. The free press version records police units ‘indiscriminately assaulting 
passengers with batons and pepper spray’. What is not contested is that people in the Hong 
Kong MTR were beaten and pepper-sprayed. The Mass Transit Railway Corporation, 
majority owned by the Hong Kong government, refused to release portions of the relevant 
close-circuit television, and since then rumors are that some passengers did not walk out of 
the station. Figure 10. The emergent critique of the MTR, in response to this incident and 
others, circulated among concerned publics and reterritorialized authority in the moral 













Simon Schama has already placed the Hong Kong 2019 collective action alongside 
“Gandhi’s India, Mandela’s South Africa and Martin Luther King’s Alabama march.” 
Contending worldviews are at stake. The sophisticated PRC media apparatus, producing 
information for domestic and international audiences, circulates discursive nationalism in 
which social movement activity reflects the influence of so-called hostile foreign forces. 
According to the current Chinese Ambassador to the United States of America, for instance, 
‘The biggest peril for “one country, two systems” comes from ill-intentioned forces, both 
inside and outside Hong Kong, who seek to turn the [special administrative region] into a 
bridgehead to attack the mainland’s system and spark chaos across China’. Similar concerns 
about ‘color revolutions’ appear widely in the state media. 
 
The PRC is what the constitutional law scholar Guo Yanbin calls a composite state in which 
Hong Kong is analogous to a city-state with autonomous powers. Hong Kong in the PRC is 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or the Hong Kong SAR. Its constitutional 
basis is the Basic Law of Hong Kong, established in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Agreement, 
an international treaty, which states the ‘capitalist system and way of life shall remain 
unchanged for 50 years’ under a ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement. When Hong Kong 
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became an SAR at the end of the British colonial era it appeared to be a novel bridge across 
complex differences in political-economic systems. 
 
The context challenges comparative research. To what cities in 2019 should Hong Kong be 
compared—Barcelona, Beirut, Berlin, Bogotá? As one headline proposes, “Hong Kong is one 
of the most unequal cities in the world. So why aren’t the protesters angry at the rich and 
powerful?” The idea of a great commercial city coming under authoritarian governance runs 
antithetical to concepts of the global city, world city, and municipality. After the ‘lost decade’ 
in Japan, the 1990s, the ungainly yet apt NY-Lon-Kong emerged in Asian city talk as Hong 
Kong replaced Tokyo in Saskia Sassen’s triumvirate. Like the Editorial Board of the 
Financial Times says, ‘Hong Kong’s status as a media hub, with robust protection for 
freedom of expression, is an important part of the mix that made the territory Hong Kong one 
of the great global cities’. It is this understanding about Hong Kong as the global city of the 
Asia-Pacific that retrieves the municipality from its pedestrian assignments.  
 
The urban political concept of the municipality, a self-governing city with autonomous  
rights, appears in the French municipalité as a town, city, or district with local self-
government. The meaning extends to the people of the city or body politic. Its deeper 
etymology is the Latin municipium. In The Municipalities of the Roman Empire, James Reid 
inquires, ‘What then were the marks by which the Greeks and Romans were enabled to 
distinguish between the city and the village? … The first and most vital characteristic of the 
normal municipality was that it should possess either complete local autonomy or a large 
measure of self-government’. It is noteworthy that the municipality emerged with civic self-
government on whose functioning empires depended.  
 
But the reality of Hong Kong in the PRC presents a territorial problematic. The SAR is a 
province-level administrative division in China, not a city. Contrary to its global city profile, 
the Hong Kong SAR means something other than a city in China. In the Chinese system of 
administrative divisions, the SAR is a revision of an historical concept for areas that require a 
different governing approach. In the imperial era special administrative areas were 
implemented along frontiers where local populations contended with the expansionary Qing 
empire (1644–1911). Contemporary administrative divisions are also subject to 
reterritorialization, historical revision, and policy change.  
 
Among types of changes, relatively moderate forms include changes in the functional 
relationship and the ‘alteration of the dominant-subordinate relationship’. An apparent 
indirect adjustment of the functional type took place two months before the central 
government implemented the state security law. In April 2020 the Chinese central 
government declared, in a clarification, the Liaison Office in Hong Kong was not bound by 
Article 22 of the Basic Law, which articulates the prevention of interference by PRC units 
and departments. Confusion ensued over the ‘clarification’, which rescaled the office from 
subsidiary to outranking, or outflanking, the Hong Kong government. The announcement 
compelled Anson Chan Fang On-sang, Chief Secretary at the transfer of Hong Kong from 
British colony to PRC sovereignty, to write, “The office was never supposed to play a role in 
Hong Kong’s policymaking and day-to-day administration, let alone become a centre of 
power.” Struggles on the ground refract understandings about such mutable power relations. 
 
Latent transmutations also inhere in political text. Where legal analysts seek to read in ‘one 
county, two systems’ predictable norms, the PRC leadership periodically intones that one 
country is more important than two systems. The contingent analysis is that yiguo liangzhi 
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(one country, two systems) is a type of tifa or formulation in the dialectics of political 
thought, as Michael Schoenhals explains in Doing Things with Chinese Words, which the 
state may reinterpret to suit new goals. The Chinese central government has recently 
articulated some of these in the state security law attached to Hong Kong. The text of that 
law, in reflection on the anguished history of foreign imperialism and extraterritoriality on 
the China coast, would paradoxically sketch a new extraterritoriality with global reach. It 
would also override the September 2019 withdrawal of the extradition bill. 
 
In Undoing the Demos, Wendy Brown writes ‘When the domain of the political itself is 
rendered in economic terms, the foundation vanishes for citizenship concerned with public 
things and the common good’. We are meant to understand Brown’s evaluation as a general 
condition of the malaise of democracy wherever neoliberalism flourishes, and the global city 
of Hong Kong swells with inequality driven by capitalist freedoms. Via this logic the 
government has compelled business elites to support the new security law. Yet distributions 
of power and possibilities of expression underpin the political systems at the center of 
Brown’s critique, making it, on a comparative basis, perhaps a relative indulgence. On the 
original date of the Legislative Council election, 6 September 2020, citizens gathered in 
public space to share concern about its postponement, and some 300 were arrested. 
Meanwhile a memory hole opened to ‘restore the truth’ about the 7.21 Incident. 
 
The politics of language meets the language of politics in democratic centralism, the 
organizational principle of the CCP in which debate and decision-making on behalf of the 
people take place only within party ranks. The unitary state formation precludes political 
freedoms including universal suffrage. Hong Kong is the only place in China where a social 
movement for liberal freedoms takes place. Though the District Council election is a 
relatively minor affair, through the ballot box Hong Kong people effectively rejected the 
sovereign. District councillors in Hong Kong work only for community interests, yet they 
represent the city and the grassroots. In response the party-state seeks to universally control 
the political discourse, which demonstrates a certain understanding of the global city. 
 
   
   
